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Abstract
We consider the problem of a fair collective choice function (fair CCF) which
maps each proﬁle of extended preference orderings into the set of fair social states
(the set consists of alternatives which are both Pareto eﬃcient and envy-free)
when such a set exists. Our main objective is to examine compatibility of fair
social choices with collective rationality. We formulate desirable properties of
collective rationality, and look for CCFs satisfying them. Next, we show that
there is no CCF that satisﬁes most of the choice-consistency properties and a
simple concept of fairness simultaneously. Moreover, we reveal that there exists
no collective choice function that selects eﬃcient and envy-free states cannot be
rationalized by a social preference relation.
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The objective of this paper is to examine compatibility of fair social choices with col-
lective rationality. Here we deﬁne fair social states as Pareto eﬃcient and envy-free
states. The concept of equity as no-envy is central among various equity concepts that
have been proposed and studied in economics. However, as Fleurbaey (2008) pointed
out, the no-envy test is an all-or-nothing notion and we often face the cases in which
there are no fair allocations (Pazner and Schmeidler 1974; Fleurbaey 1994). Some
studies have been trying to construct desirable rankings on the set of social states
which are not necessarily fair, and show various possibility/impossibility results about
social ranking rules or choice functions based on the concept of fairness. (Feldman and
Kirman 1974; Varian 1976; Suzumura 1981a; 1981b; 1983; Clauduri 1986; Diamantaras
and Thomson 1990; Tadenuma 1998; 2002; 2008; Fleurbaey 2008). Suzumura (1981a;
1981b) classiﬁes consistency axioms of choice functions and examines whether choice
functions that select all fair social states for each proﬁle of preferences satisfy these con-
sistency axioms. Then, he obtains largely negative results. Tadenuma (2002) analyzes
theoretical consequences of combining the Pareto quasi-ordering and an equity order-
ing a la Feldman-Kirman (Feldman and Kirman 1974) lexicographically. He shows
that lexicographic compositions of the Pareto quasi-ordering and the equity ordering
violate acyclicity when the Pareto criterion is given priority over the equity criterion.
Another example is the study by Fleurbaey and Trannoy (2003) that shows any social
ranking based on equity as no-domination in commodities and Pareto quasi-orderings
generates a cycle for some proﬁles of preference relations.1 These studies suggest that
1Equity as no-domination is a necessary condition for envy-freeness. Hence, the impossibility result
showed by Fleurbaey and Trannoy (2003) also holds under the no-envy criterion.
2attempts to respect both Pareto eﬃciency and no-envy often result in contradiction
with consistency axioms for collective choice.
This paper reexamines the results shown by these previous studies, and extends
some of them. Speciﬁcally, this paper analyzes whether possibility results are obtain-
able by weakening the requirement of fairness. We consider the requirement that a
subset of social states be chosen in the set of eﬃcient and envy-free ones whenever the
latter set is non-empty. This is weaker than the axiom “Fairness Extension” introduced
and studied in Suzumura (1981a), which requires that the whole set of eﬃcient and
envy-free states be chosen. With this requirement on fairness, we rewrite the map of
impossibility results shown by Suzumura (1981a). Moreover, we show non-existence
of a choice function that satisﬁes the above axiom on fairness and Chernoﬀ’s Axiom,
which is one of the most fundamental axioms for collective rationality. Since Chernoﬀ’s
Axiom is a necessary condition for a choice function to have a rationalization, our im-
possibility result means that no choice function that selects eﬃcient and envy-free
states cannot be rationalized by a social preference relation.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. The following section explains the deﬁni-
tions and notations of basic terminology. Section 3 introduces axioms about consistency
of collective choice and shows possibility/ impossibility results on collective rationality
and our notion of fairness. Section 4 brieﬂy discusses our results in economic envi-
ronments. Finally, Section 5 comments on further extensions and implications of our
results.
32 Basic Notations and Denitions
Let X and S stand, respectively, for the ﬁnite set of all conceivable social states and the
set of all non-empty subsets of X. We call a set S ∈ S an opportunity set. The society
consists of a ﬁnite set of individuals N = {1;2;:::;n} where |N| = n ≥ 2. Assume each
individual i ∈ N has an extended preference ordering ˜ Ri on the Cartesian product
X × N, which is reﬂexive, connected and transitive. For any (x;j);(y;k) ∈ X × N,
((x;j);(y;k)) ∈ ˜ Ri implies that being in the position of individual j in the social
state x is at least as good as being in the position of individual k in the social state
y according to i’s view. We hereafter denote ((x;j);(y;k)) ∈ ˜ Ri as (x;j) ˜ Ri(y;k) for
all (x;j);(y;k) ∈ X × N. Let ˜ Pi and ˜ Ii be the asymmetric part and the symmetric
part of ˜ Ri respectively. A proﬁle of n-tuple extended preference orderings is indexed
by ˜ RN = ( ˜ R1; ˜ R2;:::; ˜ Rn), ˜ R′
N = ( ˜ R′
1; ˜ R′
2;:::; ˜ R′
n); and so on. Let ˜ RI be the set of all
logically possible proﬁles which satisfy the axiom of identity (Sen 1970). The axiom
of identity requires that an individual i should respect an individual j’s judgment on
(x;j) and (y;j), that is,
∀x;y ∈ X;∀i;j ∈ N;(x;j) ˜ Ri(y;j) ⇔ (x;j) ˜ Rj(y;j):
A collective choice function is a mapping C : S × ˜ RI → S such that C(S;R) ⊆ S
for all S ∈ S and ˜ RN ∈ ˜ RI. Since the range of collective choice functions is the set of
non-empty subsets of X, collective choice functions are required to select some states
for each and every choice situation.
Now, we introduce concepts of eﬃciency and equity. Given a proﬁle ˜ RN = ( ˜ R1; ˜ R2;:::; ˜ Rn) ∈
4˜ RI and an opportunity set S ∈ S, for each individual i ∈ N, let i’s subjective pref-
erence ordering Ri be deﬁned by Ri = {(x;y) ∈ X × X|(x;i) ˜ Ri(y;i)}: Next, let the
Pareto quasi-ordering %P be deﬁned by %P=
∩
i∈N Ri: The set of all Pareto eﬃcient
states in S ∈ S is denoted by P(S; ˜ RN), that is, P(S; ˜ RN) = {x ∈ S|∀y ∈ S;y P x},
where ≻P denotes the asymmetric part of %P.
According to the classical deﬁnition of Foley (1967) and Kolm (1972), an individual
i ∈ N envies an individual j ∈ N at x ∈ X if and only if (x;j) ˜ Pi(x;i) holds. A state
x is said to be envy-free if and only if nobody envies other individuals at x. The set
of all envy-free states in S ∈ S is denoted by E(S; ˜ RN).
If a state in S is simultaneously Pareto eﬃcient and envy-free, the state is said to
be fair in S. The set of all fair states in S, called the fair set in S, is written as follows:
F(S; ˜ RN) = P(S; ˜ RN) ∩ E(S; ˜ RN):
Our objective is to investigate the existence and nature of fair collective choice
functions, which assigns the set of fair states whenever such a set exists. The following
explains a basic requirement of fair CCFs on which we focus in this paper.
Fairness Extension (FE):
∀ ˜ RN ∈ ˜ RI;∀S ∈ S; F(S; ˜ RN) ̸= ∅ ⇒ C(S; ˜ RN) = F(S; ˜ RN):
Suzumura (1981a) introduces the above axiom and shows many variations of choice-
consistency are incompatible with FE. Thus, we formulate a weaker concept of fairness.
5Fairness Subset Extension (FSE):2
∀ ˜ RN ∈ ˜ RI;∀S ∈ S; F(S; ˜ RN) ̸= ∅ ⇒ C(S; ˜ RN) ⊆ F(S; ˜ RN):
This axiom requires that, for all choice situations, socially chosen states be fair
when such states exist. Clearly, the axiom FE implies FSE. Our axiom focuses only
on situations where fair states exist, and these axioms therefore allow us to pick any




In this section, we examine compatibility of fair collective choice functions with collec-
tive rationality. Rationality axioms of collective choice have been investigated by many
previous studies in terms of Arrovian social choice theory. Following Suzumura’s so-
phisticated taxonomy (Suzumura 1981a; 1981b), we consider nine axioms of collective
rationality3.
First, we introduce Arrow’s axiom which plays a major role in the context of “ratio-
nalizability of choice functions.” As a preliminary step, we deﬁne the rationalizability
of choice functions. A choice function C is a mapping from S to S such that C(S) ⊂ S
2Denicolo (1999) calls this axiom “Weak Fairness Extension” and analyzes whether the requirement
of fairness is consistent with informational eﬃciency such as IIA. In this paper, the name of “Fairness
Extension” means a functional extension so we call this axiom “Fairness Subset Extension.”
3Except for Arrow’s Axiom, Chernoﬀ’s Axiom, Path-Independence, and Weak Path-Independence
 and , the following axioms are proposed and scrutinized by Suzumura (1981a; 1981b; 1983).
6for all S ∈ S. Then, a choice function is fully rational, if there exists an ordering R∗
on X such that
C(S) = {x ∈ S|@y ∈ S;yP(R
∗)x} for all S ∈ S;
where P(R∗) is the asymmetric part of R∗.
That is, a choice function C is fully rational if we can construct an ordering on
X, and the set of maximal elements of this ordering equals the chosen set of the
choice function for each and every opportunity set. Then, we call this ordering R∗
“a full rationalization of C” and this choice function C “a fully rationalizable choice
function.” In a similar way, if we can ﬁnd a reﬂexive and complete binary relation
and the set of maximal elements of the binary relation always equals a chosen set of
a choice function, then this binary relation is called “a rationalization of the choice
function” or “a binary relation rationalizing the choice function.” Arrow (1959) proves
that the following axiom is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for choice functions to
be fully rational.
Arrow’s Axiom (AA):
∀S1;S2 ∈ S; S1 ⊂ S2 ⇒ [S1 ∩ C(S2) = ∅ or S1 ∩ C(S2) = C(S1)]:
This axiom can be divided into two axioms formally. One is Chernoﬀ’s Axiom
(Chernoﬀ 1954) which is a necessary condition for a choice function to be rationalized
by a binary relation. Thus, if a choice function does not satisfy Chernoﬀ’s Axiom,
7then there exists no binary relation rationalizing this function4.
Chernoﬀ’s Axiom (CA):
∀S1;S2 ∈ S; S1 ⊂ S2 ⇒ S1 ∩ C(S2) ⊂ C(S1):
The other weak version of Arrow’s Axiom is called Dual Chernoﬀ’s Axiom.
Dual Chernoﬀ’s Axiom (DCA):
∀S1;S2 ∈ S; S1 ⊂ S2 ⇒ [S1 ∩ C(S2) = ∅ or S1 ∩ C(S2) ⊃ C(S1)]:
The next axiom is a well-known one, called “Path-Independence” which is intro-
duced by Arrow (1963) and Plott (1973). This axiom requires that ﬁnal outcomes
chosen by any successive choice situations should be independent of the order of choice
situations.
Path-Independence (PI):
∀S1;S2 ∈ S; C(S1 ∪ S2) = C(C(S1) ∪ S2):
Following Ferejohn and Grether (1977), we divide Path-Independence into two ax-
ioms.
Weak Path-Independence  (WPI-):
∀S1;S2 ∈ S; C(S1 ∪ S2) ⊂ C(C(S1) ∪ S2):
4See Tadenuma (2008, p.125). The author thanks an associate editor for the helpful remarks on
the property of Chernoﬀ’s Axiom.
8Weak Path-Independence  (WPI-):
∀S1;S2 ∈ S; C(S1 ∪ S2) ⊃ C(C(S1) ∪ S2):
Now, we proceed to the following axiom which is used in an axiomatic characteri-
zation of the Nash bargaining solution. By using an analogy of Sen’s argument (1970,
Ch.1*), this axiom can be explained as follows: if members of the best judo team of
the world are all Japanese, then the best judo team in Japan must be the best team
of the world.
Nash’s Axiom (NA):
∀S1;S2 ∈ S; [S1 ⊂ S2 & C(S2) ⊂ S1] ⇒ C(S1) = C(S2):
The remaining two axioms are Stability Axiom and Superset Axiom which are
minimal requirements of choice consistency in this paper.
Stability Axiom (ST):
∀S ∈ S; C(S) = C(C(S)):
Superset Axiom (SUA):
∀S1;S2 ∈ S;[S1 ⊂ S2 & C(S2) ⊂ C(S1)] ⇒ C(S1) = C(S2):
To make our argument easier, logical relations among the nine axioms above are
9summarized in the following proposition. Here an arrow indicates a logical implication












Proof. Most of the assertions can be directly induced by deﬁnitions or be already
proved in Blair et al . (1976), Ferejohn and Grether (1977), Plott (1973) and Suzumura
(1981a; 1983, Ch.2). Therefore, we only have to prove that PI implies NA.
Let a choice function C satisfy PI. Then, for all S1, S2 ∈ S such that S1 ⊂ S2 and
C(S2) ⊂ S1, it is trivial that S1 ∪S2 = S2 and S1 ∪C(S2) = S1 hold. Thus, PI implies
that C(S2) = C(S1 ∪ S2) = C(S1 ∪ C(S2)) = C(S1). ∥
Though these axioms are deﬁned in the framework of simple choice functions, we can
easily extend these consistency axioms to ones of a class of collective choice functions in
the previous argument. Hereafter, we apply these axioms to collective choice functions
in our framework.
10Now, let us examine the logical relationships between Fairness Subset Extension
and collective rationality axioms. The ﬁrst result shows that there exists no fair CCF
satisfying Nash’s Axiom.
Proposition 2. Suppose |X| ≥ 4. Then, there exists no CCF which satisﬁes FSE
(Fairness Subset Extension) and NA (Nash’s Axiom).
Proof. Suppose to the contrary. Let a collective choice function C satisfy FSE and
NA. Take four distinct social states x;y;z and w and let S = {x;y;z;w}. Let a proﬁle
˜ RN = ( ˜ R1; ˜ R2;:::; ˜ Rn) be such that
˜ R1|S×{1;2} : (z;1); (w;2); (x;1); (w;1); (y;1); (y;2); (z;2); (x;2),
˜ R2|S×{1;2} : (w;2); (z;1); (y;2); (z;2); (x;2); (x;1); (w;1); (y;1),5
˜ Ri|S×{1;2} = ˜ R1|S×{1;2} for all i ∈ N \ {1;2},
where ˜ Rj|S×{1;2} is the restriction of ˜ Rj on S × {1;2} for all j ∈ N, and that
∀(v;j) ∈ (X × N) \ (S × {1;2}) ; 
        
        
(x;2) ˜ P1(v;j);
(y;1) ˜ P2(v;j);
(v;j) ˜ Pi(z;1) for all i ∈ N \ {1;2};
∀i ∈ N; ∀(v;j);(u;k) ∈ (X × N) \ (S × {1;2}) ; (v;j)˜ Ii(u;k).
It is easy to show that this proﬁle satisﬁes the axiom of identity. Clearly, E(S; ˜ RN) =
{x;y}, z ≻P x and w ≻P y hold. Hence, we obtain F({x;y;z}; ˜ RN) = {y} and
5Preference orderings are written in a decreasing order from left to right according to the degree
of preference, i.e., if an alternative A is preferred to an alternative B, A must be on the left side of B.
11F({x;y;w}; ˜ RN) = {x}. By FSE, C({x;y;z}; ˜ RN) = {y} and C({x;y;w}; ˜ RN) = {x}
must be true. Then, NA implies C({x;y;z}; ˜ RN) = C({x;y}; ˜ RN) because of {x;y} ⊂
{x;y;z} and C({x;y;z}; ˜ RN) ⊂ {x;y} . Similarly, NA implies C({x;y;w}; ˜ RN) =
C({x;y}; ˜ RN) because of {x;y} ⊂ {x;y;w} and C({x;y;w}; ˜ RN) ⊂ {x;y} . However,
it is impossible that C({x;y;z}; ˜ RN) = C({x;y}; ˜ RN) = C({x;y;w}; ˜ RN) by the above
argument, so we have the desirable contradiction. ∥
Second, we derive an impossibility result about fair CCFs satisfying WPI-.
Proposition 3. Suppose |X| ≥ 4. Then, there exists no CCF which satisﬁes FSE
(Fairness Subset Extension) and WPI- (Weak Path-Independence ).
Proof. Suppose to the contrary. Let a collective choice function C satisfy FSE and
WPI-. Take four distinct social states x;y;z and w and let S = {x;y;z;w}. Consider
the proﬁle ˜ RN = ( ˜ R1; ˜ R2;:::; ˜ Rn) in the proof of Proposition 2.
By WPI-, we have C({x;y;z}; ˜ RN) ⊃ C({x}∪C({y;z}; ˜ RN); ˜ RN). Then, the non-
emptiness of CCF and C({x;y;z}; ˜ RN) = {y} imply C({x}∪C({y;z}; ˜ RN); ˜ RN) = {y}.
Because FSE means C({y;z}; ˜ RN) = {y}, we obtain C({x} ∪ C({y;z}; ˜ RN); ˜ RN) =
{y} = C({x;y}; ˜ RN).
Next, consider C({x;y;w}; ˜ RN). By WPI-, we have C({x;y;w}; ˜ RN) ⊃ C(C({x;y}; ˜ RN)∪
{w}; ˜ RN). Then, the non-emptiness of CCF and C({x;y;w}; ˜ RN) = {x} imply C(C({x;y}; ˜ RN)∪
{w}; ˜ RN) = {x}. However, it must be that C({x;y}; ˜ RN) = {y} by the above
argument. Hence, we have C(C({x;y}; ˜ RN) ∪ {w}; ˜ RN) = C({y;w}; ˜ RN) and x = ∈
C(C({x;y}; ˜ RN) ∪ {w}; ˜ RN). A contradiction.∥
Suzumura (1981a) proves that FE is incompatible with SUA which is weaker than
12NA and WPI-.
Proposition 4. (Suzumura 1981a, Th.2) Suppose |X| ≥ 3. Then, there exists
no CCF which satisﬁes FE (Fairness Extension) and SUA (Superset Axiom).
However, we obtain the following possibility result when FE is weakened to FSE.
Proposition 5. There exist CCFs which satisfy FSE (Fairness Subset Extension),
SUA (Superset Axiom) and ST (Stability Axiom).
Proof. As a preliminary step, let  be a bijection from X to {1;2;:::;|X|}. Then,
we deﬁne a -fair collective choice function C as follows: for all S ∈ S and ˜ RN ∈ ˜ RI,
C(S; ˜ RN) =

   
   
argminx∈F(S; ~ RN) (x) if F(S; ˜ RN) ̸= ∅
argminx∈P(S; ~ RN) (x) otherwise.
Obviously, the -fair collective choice function C satisﬁes FSE and ST by deﬁni-
tion. Moreover, it satisﬁes SUA because of single-valuedness of -fair CCF. ∥
Proposition 5 shows that FSE is not only consistent with SUA but also consistent
with ST. In the remainder of this paper, we will show that FE is compatible with ST.
However, we may ﬁnd these possibility results unacceptable because fair CCFs violate
some basic choice-consistency properties such as Path-Independence. In fact, the next
proposition implies that it is diﬃcult to construct a fair CCF which satisﬁes a desirable
choice-consistency property.
Proposition 6. Suppose |X| ≥ 4. Then, there exists no CCF which satisﬁes FSE
(Fairness Subset Extension) and CA (Chernoﬀ’s Axiom).
Proof. Suppose to the contrary. Let a collective choice function C satisfy FSE and
13CA. Take four distinct social states x;y;z and w and let S = {x;y;z;w}. Consider
the proﬁle ˜ RN = ( ˜ R1; ˜ R2;:::; ˜ Rn) in the proof of Proposition 2.
Then, we have C({x;y;z}; ˜ RN) = {y} and C({x;y;w}; ˜ RN) = {x} by virtue of
FSE. Consider now C({x;y;z;w}; ˜ RN). If y ∈ C(S; ˜ RN) or w ∈ C(S; ˜ RN) holds, then
it contradicts the fact that C({x;y;w}; ˜ RN) equals a singleton set {x} by virtue of
CA. Therefore we have y;w = ∈ C(S; ˜ RN). Similarly, we induce x;z = ∈ C(S; ˜ RN) by CA
and C({x;y;z}; ˜ RN) = {y}. Hence, it follows that x;y;z;w = ∈ C({x;y;z;w}; ˜ RN), but
this violates the non-emptiness of CCF. ∥
Proposition 6 shows that fair CCFs are incompatible with Chernoﬀ’s Axiom. Since
Chernoﬀ’s Axiom is a necessary condition for constructing a rationalization of CCF,
there exists no social preference relation rationalizing a CCF which assigns a subset of
fair states on each and every opportunity set whenever fair states exist.
Now, we compare our results with previous ﬁndings in Suzumura (1981a) and Tade-
numa (1998; 2002). Suzumura (1981a) shows that the axioms “Fairness Inclusion (FI)”
and “Conditional Binary Exclusion Pareto (CBEP)” are incompatible with Chernoﬀ’s
Axiom but he doesn’t say anything about the logical consequence of combining FE
and CA on a CCF 6. Since the axiom FSE implies FE, Proposition 6 implies that there
exists no CCF satisfying both FE and CA. On the contrary, Suzumura’s impossibility
result fails to show an essential conﬂict between the concept of fairness and collective
rationality, because both FI and CBEP imply that a socially chosen alternatives are
not necessarily fair.
6The axiom FI is a requirement deﬁned as follows: Suppose x;y ∈ S and y ∈ C(S). If x is more
eﬃcient (or equitable) than y, then x should be also in C(S). On the other hand, CBEP requires
that x be the only chosen state in {x;y} whenever both x and y are not envy-free and x ≻P y.
14On the other hand, Tadenuma (2002) proves that his so-called “Eﬃciency-First
Rule” –if two alternatives are Pareto comparable, then society respects the Pareto
relation; otherwise social ranking should be ordered according to the equity criterion–
has a cycle for some cases. In this lexicographic ranking, the set of maximal elements
are the set of all Pareto eﬃcient and envy-free allocations whenever fair allocations
exist. Moreover, Tadenuma (1998) proves that any CCF which satisﬁes Pareto Eﬃ-
ciency, P-Conditional No-Envy, and Chernoﬀ’s Axiom violates the non-emptiness of
CCF. Pareto Eﬃciency requires that CCFs should assign a subset of Pareto eﬃcient
allocations and P-Conditional No-Envy demands that a socially chosen set should be
included in a subset of envy-free allocations if all the available allocations are eﬃcient.
Then, it is easy to show that CCFs satisfying Pareto Eﬃciency, P-Conditional No-
Envy, and Chernoﬀ’s Axiom also satisfy FSE because these CCFs assign a subset of
fair allocations whenever they exist. Therefore, Proposition 6 is a generalization of
Tadenuma’s ﬁnding in the sense that a class of collective choice functions satisfying
FSE and Chernoﬀ’s Axiom violates the non-emptiness of CCF.
Finally, we show that FE and ST are consistent but in a trivial result.
Proposition 7. There exist CCFs which satisfy FE (Fairness Extension) and ST
(Stability Axiom).
Proof. Consider the Goldman-Sussangkarn (Goldman and Sussangkarn 1978) fair
CCF CGS deﬁned as follows7: ∀S ∈ S, ∀ ˜ RN ∈ ˜ RI;
7This CCF was proposed by Suzumura (1981b).
15CGS(S; ˜ RN) =

        
        
F(S; ˜ RN) if F(S; ˜ RN) ̸= ∅
E(•) ∪ {x ∈ P(•)|∀y ∈ E(•);x ≻P y} if E(•) ̸= ∅ & F(•) = ∅
P(S; ˜ RN) otherwise.
Or we deﬁne the Eﬃciency-First CCF CPE such that:
∀S ∈ S, ∀ ˜ RN ∈ ˜ RI;
CPE(S; ˜ RN) =

   
   
E(P(S; ˜ RN); ˜ RN) if E(P(S; ˜ RN); ˜ RN) ̸= ∅
P(S; ˜ RN) otherwise.
It is easy to verify that both CCFs satisfy FE and ST. ∥
Propositions 1-7 reveal conﬂicts between collective rationality and our requirement
of fairness, and we can summarize these results as follows.
Theorem 1. Suppose |X| ≥ 4. Let CCF satisfy FSE (Fairness Subset Extension).
Then, there exists no CCF satisfying any of the following consistency axioms: AA (Ar-
row’s Axiom), CA (Chernoﬀ’s Axiom), DCA (Dual Cernoﬀ’s Axiom), PI (Path Inde-
pendence), WPI- (Weak Path Independence-), WPI- (Weak Path Independence-),
and NA (Nash’s Axiom).
4 Impossibility Results in Economic Environments
This section shows that the previous results obtained in abstract environments also
hold true in economic environments. In the previous section, we assume each proﬁle of
extended preference relations satisﬁes the axiom of identity. In this section, however,
we suppose that all preference relations are monotonic and continuous.
16We consider the classical model of a division economy with n individuals and
l goods. Let allocation be a vector x = (x1;x2;:::;xn) ∈ Rnl
+ where each xi =
(xi1;:::;xil) ∈ Rl
+ is a consumption bundle of individual i ∈ N. In this setting of
economic environments, we assume that X = Rnl
+ and denote S by the set of all ﬁnite
non-empty subsets of X. Each individual is assumed to have a preference ordering
on his/her consumption bundle which is monotonic and continuous. Let RE be the
set of all preference relations on Rl
+ that satisfy reﬂexivity, connectedness, transitiv-
ity, monotonicity and continuity. We write the set of proﬁles of preference orderings
satisfying monotonicity and continuity as RE.
Then, we can redeﬁne the set of Pareto eﬃcient allocations and the set of envy-free
allocations as follows: For all S ∈ S, RN ∈ RE,
P(S;RN) := {x ∈ S|@y ∈ S;[∀i ∈ N;yiRixi and ∃j ∈ N;yjPjxj};
E(S;RN) := {x ∈ S|∀i;j ∈ N;xiRixj}:
The axioms of FSE and choice-consistency in economic environments readily fol-
low from the ones in the previous section; we omit the redeﬁned statements of these
requirements.
Now we show the existence of fair CCFs satisfying SUA and ST in economic envi-
ronments.
Proposition 8. Suppose X = Rnl
+ and ∀i ∈ N;Ri ∈ RE. Then, there exist
CCFs which satisfy FSE (Fairness Subset Extension), SUA (Superset Axiom) and ST
(Stability Axiom).
Proof. Consider a collective choice function CL as follows: for all S and RN,
17CL(S;RN) =

   
   
{x ∈ F(S;RN)|∀y ∈ F(S;RN);x ≥L y} if F(S;RN) ̸= ∅
{x ∈ P(S;RN)|∀y ∈ P(S;RN);x ≥L y} otherwise,
where a binary relation ≥L is a lexicographic order8.
Since the above CCF is a single-valued, it satisﬁes the axiom SUA. It is obvious
that this CCF also satisﬁes both FSE and ST by deﬁnition. ∥
Next we prove the axiom FSE is inconsistent with most of the choice-consistency
axioms. As a preliminary step, we prove that a similar situation used in the proofs of
Propositions 2, 3, and 6 also holds in economic environments.
Lemma 1 (Cf: Tadenuma 2002, Prop. 1). There exist a proﬁle RN ∈ RE and
four allocations x;y;z;w ∈ X such that E({x;y;z;w};RN) = {x;y}, P({x;z};RN) =
{z}, P({y;w};RN) = {w} and P({s;t};RN) = {s;t} for all distinct pairs {s;t} except
for {x;z} and {y;w}.
Proof. For simplicity, we consider a two-individuals and two-goods economy. Note
that we can ﬁnd similar examples for any pure exchange economies. Let an ini-
tial endowment be (10;10). Consider four feasible allocations x;y;z;w such that
x = ((9;1);(1;9)); y = ((8;2);(2;8)); z = ((7;1:9);(3;8:1)); w = ((6;2:9);(4;7:1)).
Suppose each individual has a preference relation Ri (i = 1;2) on R2
+ that is repre-
sented by the following utility function:
U1(x11;x12) = x11x12,
U2(x21;x22) = x21 + 2x22.
8A Lexicographic order is deﬁned as follows: For all x;y ∈ X,
x ≥L y ⇔ ∃m > 0;∀i < m; xi = yi & xm ≥ ym.
18Then, it follows E({x;y;z;w};RN) = {x;y} by deﬁnition. Since an allocation z is
Pareto superior to x and so is w to y, we have P({x;z};RN) = {z} and P({y;w};RN) =
{w}. Finally, because all pairs {x;y}, {x;w}, {y;z} and {z;w} are Pareto non-
comparable, we have P({s;t};RN) = {s;t} for all distinct pairs {s;t} except for {x;z}
and {y;w}.∥
We can prove the following impossibility theorem by using Lemma 1 and proofs
which are similar to that of Propositions 2, 3 and 6 in the last section. Hence, the
impossibility theorem holds true in economic environments as well as in abstract en-
vironments.
Theorem 2. Suppose X = Rnl
+ and ∀i ∈ N;Ri ∈ RE. Let CCF satisfy FSE (Fair-
ness Subset Extension). Then, there exists no CCF satisfying any of the following
consistency axioms: AA (Arrow’s Axiom), CA (Chernoﬀ’s Axiom), DCA (Dual Cer-
noﬀ’s Axiom), PI (Path Independence), WPI- (Weak Path Independence-), WPI-
(Weak Path Independence-), and NA (Nash’s Axiom).
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper reexamines the relationships between collective rationality and the concept
of fairness. We prove that there are CCFs satisfy FSE, SUA and ST. However, we
show any fair CCF violates Chernoﬀ’s axiom, and thus there is no rationalization of a
fair CCF.
Now it should be noted that our results are all based on a single-proﬁle. In contrast
to the multi-proﬁle case, it holds without imposing any requirement of informational
19eﬃciency such as IIA. In addition, the same impossibility results holds true even if
we require that a socially chosen set should be a subset of envy-free and weak Pareto
eﬃcient alternatives9.
Finally if we weaken Fairness Subset Extension suﬃciently, we can construct fair
CCFs satisfying some basic axioms of collective rationality such as PI. Consider the
following axiom:
Minimal Fairness10:
∀ ˜ RN ∈ ˜ RI;∀S ∈ S; F(S; ˜ RN) ̸= ∅ ⇒ C(S; ˜ RN) ∩ F(S; ˜ RN) ̸= ∅:
Then, the following CCF CEP satisﬁes both the above fairness axiom and PI.
CEP(S; ˜ RN) =

   
   
P(E(S; ˜ RN); ˜ RN) if E(S; ˜ RN) ̸= ∅
P(S; ˜ RN) otherwise.
Since the set S\E(S; ˜ RN) could contain alternatives that are Pareto superior to the
elements of CEP(S; ˜ RN), we have F(S; ˜ RN) ⊆ CEP(S; ˜ RN) for all S and ˜ RN. Hence,
this CCF CEP violates FSE but satisﬁes Minimal Fairness. In addition, it can be
proved this CCF satisﬁes PI11. However, a class of CCFs satisfying Minimal Fairness
includes a trivial CCF, which associates with each (S; ˜ RN) the set of all available
alternatives. The trivial CCF makes no sense on the issues of distributive justice
because a social preference relation rationalizing this function is a null preference,
9An alternative is weak Pareto eﬃcient if there is no other available alternative that makes all
individuals strictly better oﬀ. Obviously, the set of weak Pareto eﬃcient alternatives is included in
the set of Pareto eﬃcient ones.
10This axiom is proposed by an anonymous referee. The author is thankful for the helpful
suggestions.
11The reader can also check that this CCF violates DCA.
20which is indiﬀerent among all alternatives. Hence we need to consider additional
axioms under the requirement of Minimal Fairness in order to rule out the trivial
CCF.
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